Abstract. In a cost-sharing problem, several participants with unknown preferences vie to receive some good or service, and each possible outcome has a known cost. A cost-sharing mechanism is a protocol that decides which participants are allocated a good and at what prices. Three desirable properties of a cost-sharing mechanism are: incentive-compatibility, meaning that participants are motivated to bid their true private value for receiving the good; budget-balance, meaning that the mechanism recovers its incurred cost with the prices charged; and economic efficiency, meaning that the cost incurred and the value to the participants are traded off in an optimal way. These three goals have been known to be mutually incompatible for thirty years. Nearly all the work on cost-sharing mechanism design by the economics and computer science communities has focused on achieving two of these goals while completely ignoring the third.
1. Introduction 1.1. MECHANISM DESIGN. In the past decade, there has been a proliferation of large systems used and operated by independent agents with competing objectives (most notably the Internet). Motivated by such applications, an increasing amount of algorithm design research studies optimization problems that involve self-interested entities. Naturally, game theory and economics are important for modeling and solving such problems. Mechanism design is a classical area of microeconomics that has been particularly influential. The field of mechanism design studies how to solve optimization problems in which part of the problem data is known only to self-interested players. It has numerous applications to, for example, auction design, pricing problems, and network protocol design [Feigenbaum and Shenker 2002; Hartline 2003; Mas-Colell et al. 1995; Osborne and Rubinstein 1994] .
Selling a single good to one of n potential buyers is a paradigmatic problem in mechanism design. Each bidder i has a valuation v i , expressing its maximum willingness to pay for the good. We assume that this value is known only to the bidder, and not to the auctioneer. A mechanism for selling a single good is a protocol that determines the winner and the selling price. Each bidder i is "selfish" in that it wants to maximize its "net gain" (v i − p)x i from the auction, where p is the price, and x i is 1 if the bidder wins and 0 if the bidder loses.
What optimization problem underlies a single-good auction? One natural goal is economic efficiency, which in this context demands that the good is sold to the bidder with the highest valuation. This goal is trivial to accomplish if the valuations are known a priori. Can it be achieved when the valuations are private? Vickrey [1961] provided an elegant solution. First, each player submits a sealed bid b i to the seller, which is a proxy for its true valuation v i . Second, the seller awards the good to the highest bidder. This achieves the efficient allocation if we can be sure that players bid their true valuations-if b i = v i for every i. To encourage players to bid truthfully, we must charge the winner a non-zero price. (Otherwise, all players will bid gargantuan amounts in an effort to be the highest.) On the other hand, if we charge the winning player its bid, it encourages players to underbid. (Bidding your maximum willingness to pay ensures a net gain of zero, win or lose.) Vickrey [1961] suggested charging the winner the value of the second-highest bid, and proved that this price transforms truthful bidding into an optimal strategy for each bidder, independent of the bids of the other players. In turn, the Vickrey auction is guaranteed to produce an efficient allocation of the good, provided all players bid in the obvious, optimal way.
COST-SHARING MECHANISMS.
The revenue obtained by a mechanism can be as or more important than its economic efficiency, especially in settings where the mechanism designer incurs a non-trivial cost, such as production costs. This issue motivates the study of cost-sharing mechanisms that guarantee sufficient revenue to cover the incurred costs. Moulin and Shenker [2001] describe a range of applications of cost-sharing mechanisms across economics, and Feigenbaum et al. [2001] motivate the study of such mechanisms from a computer networking perspective.
Formally, a cost-sharing problem is defined by a set U of players vying to receive some good or service, and a cost function C : 2 U → R + describing the cost incurred by the mechanism as a function of the auction outcome-the set S of winners. We assume that C(∅) = 0 and that C is nondecreasing (i.e., S ⊆ T implies C(S) ≤ C(T )). We impose no explicit limit on the number of winners, but a large number of winners might result in extremely large costs. The problem of selling a single good can be viewed as the special case in which C(S) = 0 if |S| ≤ 1 and C(S) = +∞ otherwise. A more complex example is a Steiner tree cost-sharing problem, where U represents a set of potential clients, located in an undirected graph with fixed edge costs, that want connectivity to a server t [Feigenbaum et al. 2001; Jain and Vazirani 2001] . In this application, C(S) denotes the cost of connecting the terminals in S to t-the cost of the minimum-cost Steiner tree that spans S ∪ {t}. For a cost function C and a valuation profile {v i } i∈U , the efficient allocation is the subset that maximizes the social welfare: W (S) = v(S) − C(S), where v(S) denotes i∈S v i .
For a given set U and function C, a cost-sharing mechanism is a protocol that decides which players win and at what prices. Typically, such a mechanism is also (perhaps approximately) budget-balanced, meaning that the cost incurred is passed on to the auction's winners. Budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms provide control over the revenue generated, relative to the cost incurred by the mechanism designer.
Summarizing, we have identified three natural goals in cost-sharing mechanism design: incentive-compatibility, meaning that every player's optimal strategy is to bid its true private value v i for receiving the service; budget-balance, meaning that the mechanism recovers its incurred cost with the prices charged; and efficiency, meaning that the cost and valuations are traded off in an optimal way.
Unfortunately, roughly thirty years ago, Green et al. [1976] and Roberts [1979] ruled out the existence of mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy these three constraints, even in very simple cost-sharing problems. This impossibility result motivates relaxing at least one of these properties. Until recently, nearly all work in cost-sharing mechanism design completely ignored either budget-balance or efficiency. Without the budget-balance constraint, there is an extremely powerful and flexible mechanism that is incentive-compatible and efficient: the VCG mechanism (see, e.g., Feigenbaum et al. [2001] and Moulin and Shenker [2001] ). This mechanism specializes to the Vickrey auction when selling a single good, but it is far more general. The VCG mechanism is typically not approximately budget-balanced for any reasonable approximation factor (assuming "individually rational" prices, see, e.g., Feigenbaum et al. [2003] 
for details).
A second approach is to discard economic efficiency as an objective and insist on incentive-compatibility and budget-balance. Until very recently [Mehta et al. 2009 ], the only general technique for designing mechanisms of this type was due to Moulin [1999] . Researchers have developed numerous approximately budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms for cost-sharing problems arising from different combinatorial optimization problems, including fixed-tree multicast problems [Archer et al. 2004 , Feigenbaum et al. 2001 , 2003 ]; more general submodular problems [Moulin 1999; Moulin and Shenker 2001] ; scheduling problems [Bleischwitz and Monien 2006; Brenner and Schäfer 2007] ; network design problems [Gupta et al. 2007 , Jain and Vazirani 2001 Kent and Skorin-Kapov 1996; Könemann et al. 2008; Pál and Tardos 2003] ; facility location problems [Leonardi and Schäfer 2004; Pál and Tardos 2003] ; and various covering problems [Devanur et al. 2005; Immorlica et al. 2008] . With one exception discussed below, none of these works provided any guarantees on the economic efficiency achieved by the proposed mechanisms. [Cook 1971 ], as well as information-theoretic lower bounds in restricted models of computation like online [Borodin and El-Yaniv 1998 ] and streaming algorithms [Muthukrishnan 2005 ], algorithm designers are accustomed to devising heuristics and proving worst-case guarantees about them using approximation measures. This approach can also be applied to cost-sharing mechanism design to quantify the inevitable efficiency loss in incentive-compatible, budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms. As worst-case approximation measures are rarely used in economics, this research direction has not been pursued previously.
Quantifying efficiency loss in cost-sharing mechanisms is an important goal for several reasons. First, a quantitative approximation measure is necessary to rigorously compare the economic efficiency of different mechanisms for a costsharing problem, and to identify a mechanism as "optimally efficient" subject to budget-balance constraints. Second, such a measure allows us to define and compare the intrinsic complexity of cost-sharing problems. To give an analogy, recall that the "difficulty" of an NP-hard optimization problem is often identified with the best-possible approximation ratio achievable by a polynomial-time algorithm for it, assuming P = NP (see, e.g., Arora and Lund [1997] ). For a cost-sharing problem, we can similarly interpret the efficiency guarantee achieved by an optimally efficient mechanism as a measure of the problem's "complexity". Third, even when economic efficiency is not the primary objective, requiring "reasonable" (but not necessarily optimal) efficiency can be useful for constraining the mechanism design space. For example, the intuitively "undesirable" family of mechanisms identified by Immorlica et al. [2008, Example 4 .1], which stubbornly satisfy a long list of standard mechanism design requirements, admit no non-trivial efficiency guarantees.
The sole previous work on quantifying efficiency loss in budget-balanced costsharing mechanisms is by Moulin and Shenker [2001] , who studied submodular cost-sharing problems and an additive notion of efficiency loss. Their results successfully rank different fully budget-balanced mechanisms for an arbitrary but fixed submodular cost-sharing problem according to worst-case efficiency loss (see also Section 4). However, it is not obvious how to use their efficiency loss measure to make comparisons between different cost-sharing problems. Additionally, the approach in Moulin and Shenker [2001] has not yet been extended beyond submodular cost-sharing problems, and most of the problems studied in the computer science literature fall outside of this class [Bleischwitz and Monien 2006; Brenner and Schäfer 2007; Gupta et al. 2007 Gupta et al. , 2008 Immorlica et al. 2008; Vazirani 2001, 2008; Kent and Skorin-Kapov 1996; Könemann et al. 2008; Leonardi and Schäfer 2004; Pál and Tardos 2003 ]. Green et al. [1976] and Roberts [1979] motivate approximate notions of budget-balance and economic efficiency. In this article, we define a mechanism to be β-budget-balanced for a parameter β ≥ 1 if the sum of the prices charged is always at least the cost incurred and is also at most β times this cost. Several previous works instead require that the revenue is no more than and at least a 1/β fraction of the incurred cost; we obtain similar results for this alternative definition (see Sections 1.7 and 6).
HOW TO QUANTIFY INEFFICIENCY?. The impossibility results in
Several definitions of approximate efficiency are possible. Arguably, the most natural requirement is to insist that a mechanism always computes an outcome S that is a ρ-approximation of the social welfare:
, where S * is the economically efficient solution. Unfortunately, Feigenbaum et al. [2003] shattered any hope for such a guarantee, even in very simple cost-sharing problems: for every β ≥ 1 and β-budget-balanced incentive-compatible mechanism, there is a valuation profile such that the efficient solution has strictly positive welfare but the mechanism produces the empty outcome (with zero welfare). Thus, every mechanism, no matter how intuitively "good" or "bad", is a 0-approximation algorithm for the social welfare objective. This inapproximability result is characteristic of mixed-sign objective functions such as the social welfare.
We must therefore measure efficiency loss in a different way. Our basic efficiency guarantees have the following form, for a parameter ρ ≥ 0 and a mechanism for the cost-sharing problem C: for every valuation profile,
where S is the output of the mechanism and S * is an efficient outcome. In this case, we call the mechanism ρ-approximate.
We have chosen to present this efficiency guarantee in terms of additive welfare loss, but it is robust and admits several different interpretations. For example, the bound in (1) implies a relative approximation guarantee for a different formulation of economic efficiency. Precisely, define the social cost π(S) of an outcome S to be the cost incurred by the mechanism plus the sum of the excluded valuations (i.e., opportunity cost):
Since social cost and social welfare are related by the affine transformation π(S) = −W (S) + v(U ), minimizing the social cost is ordinally equivalent to maximizing the social welfare. The two objective functions are not, of course, equivalent from an approximation perspective. Indeed, while the impossibility result in Feigenbaum et al. [2003] precludes any relative approximation of the social welfare, every ρ-approximate cost-sharing mechanism also (ρ + 1)-approximates the social cost. Such non-approximation-preserving transformations are common in applications with mixed-sign objective functions, including prize-collecting combinatorial optimization problems (e.g., Bienstock et al. [1993] ) and discrete maximumlikelihood problems (e.g., Kleinberg and Tardos [2002] ). A second interpretation of the bound in (1) is motivated by the examples used in the impossibility result in Feigenbaum et al. [2003] . These examples are intuitively difficult because the optimal outcome S * has large cost C(S * ) and value v(S * ) only slightly larger than C(S * ), leaving the mechanism with no "margin for error". Can we obtain a relative approximation of welfare when the value of an optimal outcome is bounded away from its cost? To formalize this question, we say that an outcome
The punchline, proved via a simple calculation, is this: if a mechanism is ρ-approximate, then ρ is the separation threshold beyond which non-trivial welfare approximation is possible. Precisely, a ρ-approximate mechanism extracts at least a (1 − ρ/η) fraction of the optimal welfare when the optimal outcome is η-separated.
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T. ROUGHGARDEN AND M. SUNDARARAJAN 1.5. OUR TECHNIQUES: MOULIN MECHANISMS AND SUMMABILITY. Our overarching goal is to identify tight upper and lower bounds on the best-possible efficiency guarantees of incentive-compatible and budget-balanced mechanisms for a wide range of cost-sharing problems. Our first contribution is a general analytical framework for proving such bounds (Section 3). The framework applies to Moulin mechanisms, the dominant paradigm in budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanism design.
Roughly, a Moulin mechanism simulates an ascending iterative auction. In each iteration, a price χ(i, S) is offered to each player i of the remaining players S. Players that accept remain in contention; the others are removed. The mechanism halts when all remaining players accept the prices offered to them. To achieve approximate budget-balance, the mechanism offers prices at each iteration that approximately cover the cost that would be incurred if the iteration is the last. To obtain incentive-compatibility, a Moulin mechanism offers each player a non-decreasing sequence of prices. The function χ is called a costsharing method, and it uniquely defines the corresponding Moulin mechanism. (See Section 2 for formal definitions.) Until very recently, almost all approximately budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms were Moulin mechanisms [Bleischwitz and Monien 2006; Brenner and Schäfer 2007; Gupta et al. 2007 Gupta et al. , 2008 Immorlica et al. 2008; Vazirani 2001, 2008; Kent and Skorin-Kapov 1996; Könemann et al. 2008; Leonardi and Schäfer 2004; Moulin and Shenker 2001; Pál and Tardos 2003] , with the mechanisms of Devanur et al. [2005] forming a notable exception.
Our first main result is a characterization of the worst-case efficiency loss of a Moulin mechanism in terms of a single parameter of its underlying cost-sharing method. Given a cost-sharing method χ and a cost function C defined over the same set U of players, this parameter α is easy to describe. We say that the method χ is α-summable for C if the following condition holds for every subset S ⊆ U and every ordering of the players of S:
where i and S denote the th player and the set of the first players in the ordering, respectively. In other words, start with the empty set, add players of S one-by-one according to the given ordering, and let X denote the cost share of the th player (according to χ) when the player is first added. The cost-sharing method χ is α-summable for C if the sum X only overestimates the cost of C(S) by an α factor (for a worst-case choice of the subset S and the ordering of the players).
For example, in the special case of a symmetric cost function and equal cost shares, summability is a measure of the "amount of concavity" of the cost function. Consider the function C(S) = |S| d for d ∈ [0, 1] on the universe U = {1, 2, . . . , n} and the cost-sharing method χ(i, S) = C(S)/|S| = |S| d−1 . The summability of χ is then determined by the set S = U ; the ordering σ is irrelevant. A simple calculation shows that this summability is roughly 1/d for fixed d > 0 and large n, and grows as ln n when d = 0.
We prove that summability characterizes approximate efficiency in the following sense: a Moulin mechanism is (α − 1)-approximate if and only if its underlying cost-sharing method is α-summable. The key idea behind our proof is to view a Moulin mechanism as a greedy descent algorithm with respect to a type of "potential function". Summability then arises naturally as a measure of proximity between this potential function and the social objective function.
1.6. OUR RESULTS: EFFICIENCY GUARANTEES FOR SUBMODULAR AND STEINER TREE PROBLEMS. Bounding the summability (3) of a cost-sharing method is a nontrivial but often tractable problem. We demonstrate this by applying our summability framework to obtain matching upper and lower bounds on the best-possible efficiency guarantees of Moulin mechanisms for two widely studied classes of cost-sharing problems, submodular problems (Section 4) and Steiner tree problems (Section 5). Since the conference version of this work , many more applications have been found; see Section 7.
A submodular cost-sharing problem is defined by a player set U and a nondecreasing cost function C such that, for every S 1 ⊆ S 2 and i / ∈ S 2 ,
Submodular cost-sharing problems admit a range of budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms [Jain and Vazirani 2008; Moulin and Shenker 2001] . One is the Shapley mechanism [Feigenbaum et al. 2001; Moulin and Shenker 2001] , whose underlying cost-sharing method is derived from the Shapley value. As a first application of our framework, we prove that for every submodular cost-sharing problem, the corresponding Shapley cost-sharing method is H k -summable, where k is the number of players served in an optimal solution, and H k = i≤k 1/i ≈ ln k denotes the kth Harmonic number. Our characterization result then implies that the Shapley mechanism is (H k − 1)-approximate and also H k -approximates the social cost for every submodular cost-sharing problem. It also implies that the Shapley mechanism is an optimal Moulin mechanism in the following sense: there is a simple submodular cost-sharing problem for which every budget-balanced Moulin mechanism is at least H k -summable. These results reprove, from a different perspective, earlier results of Moulin and Shenker [2001, Proposition 2] . Our most mathematically involved results concern the much more complex class of Steiner tree cost-sharing problems. Such problems are generally not submodular, and no efficiency guarantees of any sort were previously known for approximately budget-balanced mechanisms for such problems. Our main positive result is a proof that the 2-budget-balanced Steiner tree cost-sharing method designed by Jain and Vazirani [2001] is O(log 2 k)-summable, where k is again the number of players served in an optimal solution, and thus the corresponding Moulin mechanism (the JV mechanism) is O(log 2 k)-approximate. Our proof blends ideas inspired by online algorithms, primal-dual approximation algorithms, and our analysis for submodular cost functions. Techniques from online analysis are useful because summability is defined in terms of a worst-case player ordering; primal-dual arguments arise because the JV mechanism is based on Edmonds's primal-dual branching algorithm [Edmonds 1967 ].
Our efficiency guarantee for the JV mechanism is weaker than that for the Shapley mechanism, and this is no accident: we use our characterization result and a recursive construction to prove that every O(1)-budget-balanced Moulin mechanism for Steiner tree cost-sharing problems is (log 2 k)-approximate. Our positive results for submodular problems and this lower bound expose a non-trivial, latent approximation hierarchy among different cost-sharing problems. Of course, this 23:8 T. ROUGHGARDEN AND M. SUNDARARAJAN lower bound for Steiner tree problems trivially carries over to the more general network design cost-sharing problems studied in other works [Gupta et al. 2007 [Gupta et al. , 2008 Könemann et al. 2008; Pál and Tardos 2003 ].
1.7. OUR RESULTS: BUDGET-BALANCE VS. EFFICIENCY TRADE-OFFS. Finally, in Section 6, we extend our summability framework to quantify trade-offs between budget-balance and economic efficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms. In particular, inefficiency can be partially mitigated if the prices charged need not cover the cost incurred. Call a mechanism (β, γ )-budget-balanced if the prices charged are always at most a β factor times and at least a 1/γ fraction of the cost incurred. Permitting γ > 1 gives rise to a new source of efficiency loss: a mechanism can inadvertently service players with valuations too small to justify service. For example, a mechanism that is (β, γ )-budget-balanced with γ > 1 might produce an outcome with negative welfare.
We can extend nonetheless our summability characterization of efficiency loss: we prove that every (β, γ )-budget-balanced Moulin mechanism derived from an α-summable cost-sharing method satisfies
where S is the output of the mechanism and S * is an optimal outcome. As a consequence, such a mechanism ρ-approximates the social cost (2), where ρ = max{γ, α + γ − 1}. These guarantees are tight for all values of α and γ .
For example, consider a submodular cost-sharing problem. Dividing the cost shares of the corresponding Shapley mechanism by a γ ≥ 1 factor, we obtain a (1, γ )-budget-balanced Moulin mechanism induced by an (H n /γ )-summable costsharing method, where n is the number of players.
Thus, budget-balance can be sacrificed to gain efficiency, but there is also an intrinsic barrier: our lower bounds imply that no Moulin mechanism o( √ log n)-approximates the social cost, no matter how poor its budget-balance. Similar trade-offs between approximate budget-balance and efficiency apply to the JV mechanism and Steiner tree cost-sharing problems.
1.8. ORGANIZATION. Section 2 reviews the basics of cost-sharing mechanism design and Moulin mechanisms, and compares different notions of approximate economic efficiency. Section 3 proves that the worst-case efficiency loss of a Moulin mechanism is characterized by the summability of its cost-sharing method. Sections 4 and 5 prove matching upper and lower bounds on the best efficiency guarantees achievable by Moulin mechanisms for submodular and Steiner tree cost-sharing problems, respectively. Section 6 extends our characterization result to (β, γ )-budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms and gives quantifiable trade-offs between budget-balance and efficiency in such mechanisms. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of recent related work and open research questions.
Preliminaries
After formally defining cost-sharing mechanisms and incentive-compatibility in Section 2.1, we define approximate budget-balance and several notions of approximate efficiency in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 reviews Moulin mechanisms.
COST-SHARING MECHANISMS.
The problem input is a set U of n players and a cost function C that assigns a cost C(S) to every set S ⊆ U of players. We assume that C(∅) = 0 and that C(S) ≤ C(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ U . We sometimes refer to C(S) as the service cost, to distinguish it from the social cost (2). In addition, every player i ∈ U possesses a private, nonnegative valuation v i , representing player i's maximum willingness to pay for being included in the chosen set S.
Example 2.1 (Fixed-Tree Multicast). In a fixed-tree multicast cost-sharing problem [Feigenbaum et al. 2001; Moulin and Shenker 2001] , the cost function is implicitly defined as follows. The input is a tree T with root t and nonnegative edge costs, where each player i ∈ U is located at some vertex of T . For a subset S ⊆ U , the cost C(S) is defined as the sum of the costs of the edges in the (unique) smallest subtree that contains all of the players of S. This cost function is submodular in the sense of (4). [Jain and Vazirani 2001] generalize fixed-tree multicast problems in that the input is a graph G rather than a tree T . The cost C(S) of a subset of players is defined as that of a minimum-cost subgraph of G that spans all of the players of S as well as the root t. This cost function is not generally submodular.
Example 2.2 (Steiner Tree). Steiner tree cost-sharing problems
A mechanism collects a nonnegative bid b i from each player i ∈ U , selects a set S ⊆ U of players, and charges every player i a price p i . For cost functions that are defined implicitly as the optimal solution of an instance of a combinatorial optimization problem, as in Example 2.2, we also hold the mechanism M responsible for constructing a feasible solution to the optimization problem induced by the served set S. The cost C M (S) of this feasible solution is in general larger than the cost C(S) of an optimal solution. We insist that all prices are nonnegative ("no positive transfers"), and only allow mechanisms that are "individually rational" in the sense that p i = 0 for players i / ∈ S and p i ≤ b i for players i ∈ S. As is standard, we assume that every player aims to maximize the quasilinear utility
Our incentive-compatibility constraint is the well-known strategyproof condition, stating that truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for every player. In fact, all of the mechanisms we study meet the more stringent "groupstrategyproof" condition (Remark 2.11).
Remark 2.4. Mechanisms can be defined more generally, but the Revelation Principle [Mas-Colell et al. 1995, P.871] justifies restricting attention to the class of "direct-revelation mechanisms" defined above.
2.2. APPROXIMATE BUDGET-BALANCE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY. As discussed in the Introduction, our two cost-sharing mechanism objectives are budget-balance and economic efficiency. A mechanism M for the cost-sharing problem C is (β, γ )- 
budget-balanced if
for every outcome-set S, prices p, and, if applicable, feasible solution with service cost C M (S)-of the mechanism. A β-budget-balanced mechanism is, by definition, (β, 1)-budget-balanced. A no-deficit mechanism is β-budget-balanced for some β ≥ 1. We focus only on such β-budget-balanced mechanisms except in Section 6.
Remark 2.5. Most previous works on approximately budget-balanced costsharing mechanisms define β-budget-balance to mean (1, β)-budget-balance rather than (β, 1)-budget-balance. For the class of cost-sharing mechanisms that we study (see Section 2.3), a mechanism meeting one definition can be modified to satisfy the other by scaling its prices accordingly, and thus the two definitions are in some sense equivalent. In this article, we adopt the definition that is more convenient for stating and proving efficiency guarantees. Analogs for the alternative definition follow from our general results in Section 6.
Our primary definition of approximate efficiency measures additive welfare loss, relative to the service cost of an optimal solution (1). To recap, a mechanism for a cost-sharing problem C is ρ-approximate if, assuming truthful bids,
for every valuation profile v, where S * is the optimal outcome for this valuation profile, S is the outcome of the mechanism with this valuation profile, and W (T ) = v(T )−C(T ) denotes the social welfare of the set T ⊆ U . When it is convenient, we sometimes parametrize ρ by the number n = |U | of players or the number k = |S * | of players served in an optimal outcome. We next establish the robustness of such an approximation bound by demonstrating its consequences for alternative definitions of approximate economic efficiency.
Not all definitions of approximate efficiency provide meaningful information for cost-sharing mechanism design. As noted in Section 1.4, for each β ≥ 1 there are simple cost-sharing problems such that no incentive-compatible, β-budget-balanced mechanism obtains a non-zero fraction of the optimal welfare [Feigenbaum et al. 2003 ]. Thus, if we insist on adopting a relative approximation measure-by far the most ubiquitous kind across theoretical computer science-we must either change the objective function or restrict the allowable instances. We explore these two approaches in turn.
What is the "smallest perturbation" of the welfare objective that admits nontrivial approximation results? A minimal requirement for a credible reformulation is ordinal equivalence-for a fixed cost-sharing function and valuation profile, a subset S should be "better" than a subset T if and only if S has higher welfare than T . This requirement suggests either maximizing f (W (S)) for a strictly increasing function f or minimizing f (W (S)) for a strictly decreasing function f . Affine functions are in some sense the "least distorting" candidate functions f , and for relative approximation guarantees there is no loss of generality in considering only: C, v) , where the additive term g(C, v) is positive and independent of S; and (2) maximizing v(S) − C(S) + h(C, v) for a positive additive term h (C, v) . Since costs and valuations already occur positively in (1) and (2), respectively, we take g to be independent of C and h to be independent of v. The examples in Feigenbaum et al. [2003] are strong enough to imply that no nontrivial relative approximation is possible for these objectives unless
To avoid the awkwardness of referencing the optimal solution in the objective function itself, we take g(C, v) = v(U ) and h(C, v) = C(U ), leading to the objectives of minimizing social cost:
and maximizing social reward:
These answers to our initial question conform to previous approaches to approximating mixed-sign objective functions in other application domains, including prize-collecting combinatorial optimization (e.g., Bienstock et al. [1993] ) and maximum-likelihood inference (e.g., Kleinberg and Tardos [2002] ). Simple algebra shows that an efficiency guarantee of the form (1) implies relative approximation guarantees for the social cost and social reward objectives.
PROPOSITION 2.6 (FROM ADDITIVE TO RELATIVE APPROXIMATION). If M is a ρ-approximate mechanism for a cost-sharing problem C, then, assuming truthful bids:
(a) M is a (ρ + 1)-approximation algorithm for minimizing social cost; and (b) M is a 1/(ρ + 1)-approximation algorithm for maximizing social reward.
The guarantees in Proposition 2.6 hold even if the constants g(C, v) and h(C, v)
in the definitions of social cost (6) and social reward (7) are reduced to v(S * ) and C(S * ), respectively. A second approach to efficiency guarantees is to seek a relative approximation of welfare for the widest class of problems possible. The simple examples in Feigenbaum et al. [2003] show that restricting only the cost function is insufficient for nontrivial relative welfare guarantees. We instead study "promise problems" in which the value served by an optimal solution is bounded away from its service cost. Recall from the Introduction that an outcome S is η-separated for a param-
Call a valuation profile η-separated if there is an η-separated efficient outcome. Simple algebra implies the following.
PROPOSITION 2.7 (FROM ADDITIVE APPROXIMATION TO PROMISE PROBLEMS).
If M is a ρ-approximate mechanism for a cost-sharing problem C, then, assuming truthful bids, M is a (1 − ρ η )-approximation algorithm for social welfare for η-separated valuation profiles.
Thus, the approximation factor ρ is the separation threshold beyond which the mechanism is guaranteed to approximate the social welfare.
Finally, recall that our critique of the social welfare objective was rooted in the fact that it fails to differentiate between "better" and "worse" cost-sharing mechanisms. Does the approximation framework detailed in this section suffer the same flaw? The answer is "no": the approximation factors (in the sense of (1)) of different mechanisms for a problem can vary widely (Example 2.12 and Proposition 3.12), and the best-achievable approximation factor is different for different types of costsharing problems (Section 4 and Theorem 5.10).
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T. ROUGHGARDEN AND M. SUNDARARAJAN 2.3. MOULIN MECHANISMS. Next, we review Moulin mechanisms, the preeminent class of strategyproof, approximately budget-balanced mechanisms. A Moulin mechanism is driven by a cost-sharing method-a function χ that assigns a nonnegative cost share χ(i, S) for every subset S ⊆ U of players and every player i ∈ S. For cost functions induced by combinatorial optimization problems (such as Examples 2.1 and 2.2), a cost-sharing method outputs both cost shares and a feasible solution for the optimization problem induced by S. A cost-sharing method is (β, γ )-budget balanced for a cost function C and parameters β, γ ≥ 1 if
where C χ (S) is the cost of the feasible solution produced by the method χ. As usual, β-budget-balance is short for (β, 1)-budget-balance, and such methods are also called no-deficit. A cost-sharing method is cross-monotonic if the cost share of a player only increases as other players are removed: for all S ⊆ T ⊆ U and
Example 2.8 (Shapley and Sequential Cost-Sharing) . Consider an instance of fixed-tree multicast (Example 2.1) with tree T and player set U = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Two 1-budget-balanced cost-sharing methods are as follows. In the sequential costsharing method χ seq , given a subset S ⊆ U , each player i ∈ S pays the full cost of each edge of its (unique) path to the root of T that is not used by a player of S with lower index. In the Shapley method χ sh , each player i ∈ S pays a "fair share" of each of the edges in its path-c e /n e for an edge e of cost c e , where n e denotes the number of players of S using edge e to the reach the root of T . Since the amount a player pays for each edge in its path can only increase as other players are removed from S, both of these methods are cross-monotonic.
Given a cost-sharing method χ for a cost function C, we obtain the corresponding Moulin mechanism by simulating an iterative ascending auction, with the method χ suggesting prices for the remaining players at each iteration.
Definition 2.9 (Moulin Mechanisms). Let U be a universe of players and χ a cost-sharing method defined on U . The Moulin mechanism M(χ ) induced by χ is the following. (5) Set S := S \ {i * } and return to Step (3).
The cross-monotonicity constraint ensures that the simulated auction is ascending, in the sense that the prices that are compared to a player's bid are only increasing with time. This implies that the outcome of a Moulin mechanism is uniquely defined, independent of the choices made in Step 4. Also, the Moulin mechanism M(χ) clearly inherits the budget-balance factors of the cost-sharing method χ . Finally, Moulin [1999] proved the following.
THEOREM 2.10 (STRATEGYPROOFNESS OF MOULIN MECHANISMS [MOULIN 1999]). If χ is a cross-monotonic cost-sharing method, then the corresponding Moulin mechanism M(χ) is strategyproof.
Theorem 2.10 reduces the problem of designing an strategyproof, (β, γ )-budgetbalanced cost-sharing mechanism to that of designing a cross-monotonic, (β, γ )-budget-balanced cost-sharing method. As noted in the Introduction, until recently almost all known approximately budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms were Moulin mechanisms.
Remark 2.11. Moulin mechanisms also satisfy a stronger notion of incentive compatibility called groupstrategyproofness [Moulin 1999; Moulin and Shenker 2001] , which states that every coordinated set of false bids by a coalition should decrease the utility of some player in the coalition (or should have no effect).
By Theorem 2.10, the sequential and Shapley cost-sharing methods of Example 2.8 induce strategyproof and fully budget-balanced mechanisms for fixed-tree multicast cost-sharing problems. The classical impossibility results [Green et al. 1976; Roberts 1979] imply that neither mechanism can be fully efficient. We conclude the section with concrete examples demonstrating this.
Example 2.12 (Excludable Public Good). Consider an instance of fixed-tree multicast consisting of one link with cost 1 + and a set of n players co-located opposite the root. Such a cost function is often called an excludable public good in the economic cost-sharing literature (e.g., Deb and Razzolini [1999] and Maniquet and Sprumont [2004] ). For a valuation profile v, the efficient outcome is U if v(U ) > 1 + and ∅ otherwise. The idea is to determine "worst-case valuations" for the Moulin mechanisms M(χ seq ) and M(χ sh ) induced by the sequential and Shapley cost-sharing methods, respectively. We do this by setting the valuations of players to be as large as possible, subject to the constraint that the mechanism terminates with the empty outcome.
If all players have valuation 1 and bid truthfully, then M(χ seq ) outputs the empty outcome. If player i has valuation 1/i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and players bid truthfully, then M(χ sh ) outputs the empty outcome. These examples show that the first mechanism is no better than ≈ (n − 1)-approximate, while the second is no better than ≈ (H n − 1)-approximate, where H n = n i=1 1/i denotes the nth Harmonic number.
Summability Characterizes Approximate Efficiency
This section proves that the summability of a cost-sharing method characterizes the approximate efficiency of the corresponding Moulin mechanism. After Section 3.1 defines summability, Section 3.2 proves that it upper bounds approximate efficiency and Section 3.3 explores the senses in which this bound is tight.
3.1. SUMMABILITY. Intuitively, summability quantifies the efficiency loss from the overly aggressive removal of players by a Moulin mechanism. We motivate the formal definition via a generalization of Example 2.12, which strongly suggests that summability lower bounds the approximate efficiency of a Moulin mechanism.
Example 3.1 (Generic Lower Bound on Efficiency Loss). Let χ be a crossmonotonic cost-sharing method for the cost function C, defined on the universe U . Assume for simplicity that the method only assigns positive cost shares: χ(i, S) > 0 for all S ⊆ U and i ∈ S. Pick an ordering σ of the players of U and a subset S. Let i denote the th player and S the first players of S with respect to σ and define the parameter α S,σ by
In other words, we start with the empty set, add players of S one-by-one according to σ , and consider the cost share of the th player when it is initially added. The parameter α S,σ is the factor by which the sum of these cost shares overestimates the cost C(S) of serving all of the players. We claim that the Moulin mechanism M(χ ) is no better than (α S,σ − 1)-approximate for C. To see this, define the valuation v of the th player of S (according to σ ) to be χ (i , S ) − , where > 0 is arbitrarily small. Give players of U \ S zero valuations. The Moulin mechanism M(χ) will output the empty set. The optimal welfare is bounded below by
Since valuations outside S are zero, there is an efficient outcome S * ⊆ S, and hence the welfare loss of M(χ) on this valuation profile is at least
The summability of a cost-sharing method is then defined as the worst-case ratio of the form (9) over choices of sets S and orderings σ . Definition 3.2 (Summability). Let C and χ be a cost function and a cost-sharing method, respectively, defined on a common universe U of n players. The method χ is α-summable for C for a function α : {0, 1, 2, . .
for every ordering σ of U and every set S ⊆ U , where S and i denote the set of the first players of S and the th player of S (with respect to σ ), respectively.
Remark 3.3. We define summability as a function rather than a scalar in order to parametrize our efficiency guarantees by the number k of players served in an efficient outcome (which can be much smaller than the universe size). For example, in Sections 4 and 5 we establish summability bounds of the form α(|S|) ≤ H |S| and α(|S|) = O(log 2 |S|) for all S ⊆ U , which will lead to Moulin mechanisms that are H k -and O(log 2 k)-approximate, respectively.
EFFICIENCY GUARANTEES.
The central result of this section is the following efficiency guarantee for Moulin mechanisms derived from cost-sharing methods with small summability.
THEOREM 3.4 (SUMMABILITY UPPER BOUNDS APPROXIMATE EFFICIENCY).

Let C be a cost function defined on a universe U and χ a cross-monotonic, no-deficit, α-summable cost-sharing method for C. Then, M(χ ) is an (α(k) − 1)-approximate mechanism, where k is the size of an efficient outcome.
Propositions 2.6 and 2.7 immediately give the following corollaries.
COROLLARY 3.5. Let C be a cost function defined on a universe U and χ a cross-monotonic, no-deficit, α-summable cost-sharing method for C. Then, M(χ ) is:
(a) an α(k)-approximation algorithm for minimizing the social cost; (b) a 1/α(k)-approximation algorithm for maximizing the social reward; (c) a [1 − (α(k) − 1)/η]-approximation algorithm for maximizing welfare for η-separated valuation profiles.
We emphasize that Theorem 3.4 is completely problem-independent. Together with Definition 3.2, it distills the problem-specific aspect of simultaneously achieving good budget-balance and efficiency in Moulin mechanisms: designing a crossmonotonic and approximately budget-balanced cost-sharing method with small summability. We illustrate the generality of Theorem 3.4 in Sections 4-6 by showing matching upper and lower bounds of (log k) and (log 2 k) on the approximate efficiency of Moulin mechanisms for submodular and Steiner tree cost-sharing problems, respectively, and to quantifiable trade-offs between budget-balance and economic efficiency.
We now build up to a proof of Theorem 3.4. Fix a cost function C defined on a universe U , a valuation profile v, and an α-summable and a no-deficit crossmonotonic cost-sharing method for C. Let σ denote the reversal of the order in which the mechanism M(χ) deletes players (in some fixed trajectory), with players in the final output set S M ordered arbitrarily among the first |S M | positions. A crucial tool in our proof is the following potential function σ , which we define for each subset S ⊆ U as
where for every ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |S|}, S denotes the first players of S and i the th player of S according to σ . The ordering σ and the potential function σ are defined to ensure that the potential function value decreases with each iteration in our fixed trajectory of M(χ). We use this fact in the next lemma.
LEMMA 3.6. If S M is the final output of M(χ ) and S * is an efficient outcome for a valuation profile v, then
PROOF. The idea is to delete players from S * in the same order as M(χ) to obtain the set S M ∩ S * . More precisely, order the players i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m of S * \ S M according to their deletion by M(χ), with player i 1 deleted first. This ordering is consistent with σ . For a player i j ∈ S * \ S M , let S j denote the set of players from which it was removed by M(χ), and let S * j denote S * \ {i 1 , . . . , i j−1 }. Note that S j ⊇ S * j for every j. By the definition of M(χ ), the valuation v j of player i j is less than χ (i j , S j ). Cross-monotonicity of χ then implies that v j < χ(i j , S * j ) for every player i j ∈ S * \ S M . Using the definition of σ , we have
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Also, by definition, summability (10) bounds the distance between the potential function (11) and the social cost (2) in the following sense.
LEMMA 3.7. For every subset S ⊆ U , σ (S) ≤ v(U \S) + α(|S|) · C(S).
We are now prepared to prove Theorem 3.4. PROOF (OF THEOREM 3.4). Fix a universe U , a cost function C, and a set v of truthful bids. Let S * be an efficient outcome. Let χ be an α-summable, no-deficit, cross-monotonic cost-sharing method for C and S M the output of the corresponding Moulin mechanism M(χ) for the profile v. Define the player ordering σ and the potential function σ as in (11). We can then derive
where the first inequality follows from the no-deficit condition (8), the second from the fact that χ(i, S M ) ≤ v i for every i ∈ S M , the third from the cross-monotonicity of χ, the fourth from Lemma 3.6, and the fifth from Lemma 3.7. Rearranging terms then proves the theorem.
Remark 3.8. When the method χ is the Shapley cost-sharing method (see Section 4), our definition (11) of the potential function σ essentially coincides with that of Hart and Mas-Colell [1989] for cooperative games.
Remark 3.9. The results of this section can be interpreted as efficiency guarantees for the noncooperative participation games studied by Monderer and Shapley [1996] and Moulin [1999] . For example, Corollary 3.5(a) implies that for the social cost objective (6), the "strong price of anarchy" [Andelman et al. 2009 ] in such a game is at most the summability of the underlying cost-sharing method.
3.3. MATCHING LOWER BOUNDS. We now discuss the senses in which the bound in Theorem 3.4 is tight. The argument in Example 3.1 implies the following lower bound for strictly positive cost-sharing methods.
PROPOSITION 3.10 (SUMMABILITY LOWER BOUNDS APPROXIMATE EFFI-CIENCY I). Let χ be a cross-monotonic cost-sharing method for a cost-sharing problem C with universe U that is everywhere positive and at least α-summable. Then M(χ) is no better than (α(k) − 1)-approximate, where k is the size of an efficient outcome.
The assumption that all cost shares are positive is similar to the "strong consumer sovereignty" assumption in Moulin [1999] .
For technical reasons, summability need not lower bound the approximate efficiency of cost-sharing methods that can employ zero cost shares. To informally illustrate the issue, consider a cost-sharing problem with universe U = {1, 2, . . . , n} and two cost-sharing methods χ 1 , χ 2 defined for the restriction of this problem to U \ {1}, where the summability of χ 2 is much larger than that of χ 1 . Define χ on U by setting cost shares equals to those of χ 1 for sets that include the first player and equal to those of χ 2 for sets that do not; the first player always receives a zero cost share. The summability of χ is as large as that of χ 2 , but the Moulin mechanism M(χ) will never delete the first player and will therefore only assign cost shares according to the method χ 1 that has small summability. Thus the summability of χ is strictly larger than the approximate efficiency of the induced Moulin mechanism.
There is nevertheless a variant of Proposition 3.10 for non-positive cost-sharing methods. To state it, note that a Moulin mechanism M(χ ) for a cost-sharing problem naturally induces a Moulin mechanism for each induced subproblem (via the restriction of χ to the subproblem). We say that a Moulin mechanism M(χ) is strongly ρ-approximate if every induced mechanism is ρ-approximate for the corresponding induced cost-sharing problem. The proof of Theorem 3.4 extends directly to this notion of strong approximation.
COROLLARY 3.11. Let C be a cost function defined on a universe U and χ a cross-monotonic, no-deficit, α-summable cost-sharing method for C. Then, M(χ) is a strongly (α(k) − 1)-approximate mechanism, where k is the size of an efficient outcome.
Summability is a valid lower bound for strong approximate efficiency, even for cost-sharing methods that use zero cost shares. PROOF. Choose k, a set S with |S| = k, and an ordering of the players of S so that
, where S and i are defined in the usual way. Obtain R from S by discarding players with χ (i , S ) = 0. Since χ is cross-monotonic and C is nondecreasing, the induced ordering on R satisfies
with all cost shares positive. Mimicking Example 3.1 in the problem induced by R, the welfare loss of the induced Moulin mechanism is at least (α(k) − 1) · C(R * ), where R * denotes an optimal outcome to this induced problem.
The construction in Example 3.1 also demonstrates the tightness of the alternative guarantees in Corollary 3.5. Similar results apply for non-positive cost-sharing methods and "strong" versions of these three types of efficiency guarantees.
Submodular Cost-Sharing Problems
This section illustrates our approximation framework using submodular costsharing problems. We show how existing results of Moulin and Shenker [2001] imply approximation bounds in this special case, and also derive identical bounds using the summability approach of Section 3. We first recall a well-known mechanism based on a generalization of the Shapley method χ sh described in Example 2.8. Let C be a submodular cost function (recall (4)) defined on a player set U . The Shapley cost share χ sh (i, S) of player i in the set S is defined as follows. For a permutation σ of the players of S, let σ (i) denote the increase C(A ∪ {i}) − C(A) in cost due to i's arrival, where A ⊆ S is the set of players that precede i in σ . The Shapley cost share χ sh (i, S) is then the expected value of σ (i), where the expectation is over the (uniform at random) choice of σ . As is well known and easily checked, Shapley cost shares are 1-budget-balanced, and are cross-monotonic when the function C is submodular. The corresponding Moulin mechanism M(χ sh ) is called the Shapley mechanism for C [Moulin and Shenker 2001] . Moulin and Shenker [2001, Proposition 2] proved that, for every submodular cost function C defined on a universe U of n players, the corresponding Shapley mechanism minimizes the worst-case (over valuation profiles) additive welfare loss, over all 1-budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms. Precisely, they showed that this worst-case welfare loss, compared to an efficient solution, is at least
for every 1-budget-balanced Moulin mechanism, with equality holding for the Shapley mechanism. Since C(S) ≤ C(U ) for every S ⊆ U , the worst-case welfare loss for the Shapley mechanism is at most
and thus this mechanism is at most (H n − 1)-approximate for every submodular cost-sharing problem. Since C(S) = C(U ) for every nonempty set S ⊆ U in the excludable public good problem (Example 2.12), it provides a matching lower bound: there is submodular cost-sharing problem for which every 1-budgetbalanced Moulin mechanism is no better than (H n − 1)-approximate. These bounds can also be derived from summability arguments, and in the process extended to all no-deficit (not necessarily 1-budget-balanced) Moulin mechanisms. The lower bound is again for the special case of an excludable public good with n players. For every Moulin mechanism M(χ) induced by a cross-monotonic, no-deficit cost-sharing method χ , we can inductively order the players 1, 2, . . . , n such that χ(i, {i, i + 1, . . . , n}) ≥ 1/(n − i + 1) for every i. Defining valuations as in Example 3.1 then shows that M(χ ) is no better than (H n − 1)-approximate.
To obtain an upper bound of (H k −1) for the approximation factor of the Shapley mechanism, where k is the number of players served in an optimal solution, fix a submodular cost function C with players U , with χ sh the corresponding Shapley cost-sharing method. By Definition 3.2 and Theorem 3.4, we only need to show that
for every S ⊆ U and ordering σ of U , where S and i are defined in the usual way. A remarkable result of Hart and Mas-Colell [1989, Footnote 7] , a variant of which is also used in Moulin and Shenker [2001] to establish (12), implies that the left-hand side of (13) is independent of the ordering induced by σ on the players of S. (This can also be established directly by a counting argument.) Choosing an ordering of the players of S uniformly at random, the facts that C is nondecreasing and χ sh is 1-budget-balanced imply that
Summing over all and using the linearity of expectation shows that the expected value under a random ordering (and hence the value under every ordering) of the left-hand side of (13) is at most H |S| · C(S), completing the argument.
Remark 4.1. While the approximation bound of H k −1 is tight for an excludable public good, both of the derivations above can obviously be sharpened for particular cost functions. For example, for the cost function C(S) = |S| d with d ∈ (0, 1] and n large, the Shapley mechanism remains optimal and is roughly ( Remark 4.2. Computational complexity is not a focus of this article, but we note in passing that Shapley cost shares are generally hard to compute, in myriad senses, even for monotone and submodular cost functions [Bachrach et al. 2008] . The following randomized variant of the Shapley cost-sharing method is polynomialtime computable, cross-monotonic with probability 1, and arbitrarily close to H ksummable with high probability: choose in advance a sufficiently large polynomial number of player permutations uniformly at random, and estimate every expectation of the form E[ σ (i)] by the average value of σ (i) over the randomly chosen permutations.
Steiner Tree Cost-Sharing Problems
This section uses the summability framework of Section 3 to prove matching upper and lower bounds on the best-possible approximate efficiency of no-deficit Moulin mechanisms for Steiner tree cost-sharing problems. Both the upper and lower bounds are much more intricate than for submodular cost-sharing problems. Section 5.1 reviews a mechanism of Jain and Vazirani [2001] , and Section 5.2 proves that this mechanism is O(log 2 k)-approximate for all Steiner tree problems. Section 5.3 proves that this mechanism is optimally approximately efficient (up to constant factors).
THE JV STEINER TREE MECHANISM.
Recall that a Steiner tree cost-sharing problem (Example 2.2) is defined via an undirected graph G = (V, E) with nonnegative edge costs, a root vertex t, and a set U of players that inhabit the vertices of G. The cost C(S) of a subset S ⊆ U is defined as the cost of an optimal Steiner tree of G that spans S ∪ {t}. Such cost functions are not generally submodular, and the corresponding Shapley cost-sharing methods are not generally cross-monotonic. Several researchers have designed 2-budget-balanced and cross-monotonic Steiner tree cost-sharing methods Vazirani 2001, 2008; Könemann et al. 2008 ], and no cross-monotonic method can have better budget-balance [Immorlica et al. 2008; Könemann et al. 2008] . We work with the first of these, designed by Jain and Vazirani [2001] .
Put succinctly, the JV cost-sharing method χ JV for a Steiner tree problem is defined by equally sharing the dual growth that occurs in Edmonds's primal-dual branching algorithm [Edmonds 1967 ]. In more detail, this method works as follows.
First, given a subset S ⊆ U , form a complete directed graph H = (V H , A H ). The vertices V H are t and the vertices of G that contain at least one player of S. The cost c uw of an arc (u, w) of H equals the length of a minimum-cost u-w path in G. (Since G is undirected, arcs (u, w) and (w, u) of H have equal cost.) We then define both a feasible Steiner tree and cost shares using Edmonds's algorithm, as follows. Initialize a timer to time τ = 0 and increase time at a uniform rate. Initialize a subset F ⊆ A H to ∅. At every moment in time, the algorithm increases at unit rate a variable y A for every weakly connected component A of (V H , F) other than the one containing the root t. When an inequality of the form A⊆V H : u∈A,w / ∈A y A ≤ c uw first holds with equality, the corresponding arc (u, w) is added to F and the algorithm continues. (When this occurs for several inequalities simultaneously, all of the corresponding arcs are added.) When the algorithm terminates, the graph (V H , F) contains a directed path from every vertex to the root t. To obtain a subgraph of G that spans t and the players of S, select an arbitrary branching B (a spanning tree directed toward t) of (V H , F) and output the union of the minimum-cost paths of G that correspond to the arcs of B. To obtain cost shares, let u i denote the vertex of V H at which player i resides and set
where κ(A) is the population of S in A. Equivalently, cost shares can be defined in tandem with the above algorithm: whenever a variable y A is increased, this increase is distributed equally among the cost shares of the players of S contained in A. Jain and Vazirani [2001] proved that the method χ JV is cross-monotonic and 2-budget-balanced in the sense of the inequalities (8). The next proposition summarizes the additional properties of the JV cost-sharing method that are important for bounding its summability. To state them, we say that a player i ∈ S is active at time τ in Edmonds's algorithm if it is not in the same weakly connected component as the root t at time τ . The activity time of a player is the latest moment in time at which it is active. The notation d G (i, j) refers to the minimum cost of an i-j path in the graph G. Next, we discuss our high-level proof approach. By Theorem 3.4, we need to show that
for every Steiner tree problem C with JV method χ JV , every subset S of players, and every ordering of the players (where i and S are defined in the usual way). The challenge in proving this stems from the adversarial ordering of the players (cf., Example 5.9 below). Our proof of Theorem 5.2 resolves this difficulty with the following three-step approach. First, we build a tree T on the player set, with the same root as the given Steiner tree problem, that intuitively "inverts" an arbitrary ordering so that players closer to the root in T appear earlier in the ordering than their descendants. We pay a price for this inversion: the sum of the edge costs of T is O(log |S|) times the cost of an optimal Steiner tree.
In the second step, we define "artificial cost shares" for the players. These cost shares will approximate the JV cost shares of players in G, but it will also be straightforward to upper bound their sum. More precisely, we define the artificial cost share of the ith player (according to the given adversarial ordering) as its Shapley cost share in the tree T , assuming that precisely the first i players are present. By inequality (13), the sum of these artificial cost shares is at most H |S| times the sum of the edge costs of T , which in turn is O(log 2 |S|) times the cost of an optimal Steiner tree in G.
In the third step, we prove that Shapley cost shares in T approximate JV cost shares in G: for every player, the former is at least a constant fraction of the latter. We feel that this final step is by far the most surprising, as it relates two sets of cost shares that are defined by different methods as well as in different graphs. This final step uses properties of both the JV dual growth process and the edge cost structure in the tree T . (Figures 1(b) and 1(c) ) from the graph G (Figure 1(a) ) and ordering σ = a, b, c of the players. We now supply the details. Fix a Steiner tree cost-sharing problem with universe U , graph G = (V, E) with edge costs c, and root vertex t ∈ V . We begin with the construction of the tree T , given a subset S ⊆ U of players and an ordering σ of the players. The tree T will contain a root vertex t 0 that corresponds to t, and will contain one additional vertex for each player in S. We sometimes refer to a non-root node of T and to the corresponding player of S in G interchangeably.
Each vertex i = t 0 of T will be associated with a radius r i that serves distinct purposes in the tree T and the original graph G. First, the edge from i to its parent in T will have cost r i . Second, r i will denote the radius of a ball B i in the graph G centered at the player i. These balls will be used to determine ancestor-descendant relationships in T .
We initialize the tree T to contain only the root vertex t 0 . We give t 0 a radius of +∞, and the ball B t 0 of t 0 is defined as the entire player set S. We then add players of S to the tree T one-by-one, in the order prescribed by σ . When adding a new player i, we consider all of the balls of previously added players that contain i. If nothing else, the ball B t 0 contains i. Among all such balls, let B j be one of minimum radius r j . First, we add the node i to the tree T by making i a child of j. Second, we define the radius r i as follows. If j = t 0 , then r i is half the shortest-path distance between the root t and the player i in the graph G. If j = t 0 , then we define r i = r j /2. Third, we set the cost of the edge (i, j) in T to be this radius r i . Finally, we define the ball B i of player i to be the players of S that lie within distance r i of i in the graph G. See also Figure 1 .
To begin, we record some simple relations between shortest-path distances in T and in G; we omit the simple proofs. Now let OPT denote the cost of a minimum-cost Steiner tree in G that spans S ∪ {t}. We next give a series of three lemmas, culminating in a proof that the sum of the costs of the edges of T exceeds OPT by an O(log |S|) factor. The first lemma states that two edges of the tree T that have roughly equal cost correspond to well-separated players in the graph G; it follows easily from the way we construct T . Consider an optimal Steiner tree T * in G that spans S ∪ {t} (with cost OPT). Order the players of A = {i 1 , . . . , i q } according to a pre-order traversal of T * (starting from the root, say). As is well known, we can double every edge of T * and decompose the resulting multigraph into a collection of paths that connect pairs of adjacent players (including i 1 and i q ). This proves that
We now combine Lemma 5.5 with a grouping argument to upper bound the sum of the edge costs in the tree T .
LEMMA 5.6. The sum of the costs of the edges in T is at most (4 log 2 |S| + 5) · OPT.
PROOF. First, note that every edge cost in T is bounded above by the distance d G (i, t) in G between the root t and some player i of S. Since every such distance is a lower bound on OPT, every edge of T has cost at most OPT.
Next, let k = |S| and consider the edges that have cost lying in the interval [2 i OPT/k, 2 i+1 OPT/k) for some i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , log 2 k }. By Lemma 5.5, there are at most k/2 i−1 edges in this group. The sum of the edge costs in each of the log 2 k groups is therefore at most 4OPT. Since T has k +1 vertices, it has k edges, and thus the total cost of the edges not in any of these groups-each of which has cost less than OPT/k-is at most OPT. Summing over all of the edges proves the lemma.
Next, let χ T sh (i , S ) denote the Shapley cost share of the th player (in the given ordering σ ) in the fixed-tree multicast instance corresponding to the tree T and the set S of the first players according to σ . Since fixed-tree multicast costsharing problems are submodular (Example 2.1), inequality (13) and Lemma 5.6 immediately give the following upper bound on the sum of these Shapley cost shares. Finally, we show that the JV cost share of a player in G is at most a constant factor times its Shapley cost share in T . This is the step of the proof of Theorem 5.2 where we use specific properties of the JV cost-sharing method (Proposition 5.1).
LEMMA 5.8. Let i denote the th player and S the first players of S according to σ , respectively. For every ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |S|},
PROOF. Fix ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |S|} and let e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e p denote the sequence of edges in the i -t 0 path in T . Let c j denote the cost of edge e j . Let A j ⊆ S denote the players of S whose path to t 0 in T contains the edge e j . Let m j denote the number |A j | of such players.
Our tree construction ensures that children of i correspond only to players subsequent to i in the ordering σ , and no such players are in S . Thus A 1 = {i }, and of course
Next, fix j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , p} and consider a player i ∈ A j distinct from i . Since the edge e j separates players i and i from t 0 in T , the most expensive edge on the i -i path P in T has cost at most c j−1 . By Lemma 5.3(a), the path P has cost at most 4c j−1 . By Lemma 5.3(b), the distance d G (i , i) between the players in G is at most 8c j−1 . By Proposition 5.1(c), the players i and i are in a common connected component by the time 8c j−1 in the execution of Edmonds's algorithm that defines the JV cost share χ JV (i , S ). Crucially, it follows that if player i is active at a time subsequent to 8c j−1 in this execution, then its weakly connected component at this time does not contain the root t and contains at least the m j (active) players of A j . Similarly, Lemma 5.3 and Proposition 5.1(b) imply that player i is inactive by the time 8c p . Combining these observations with Proposition 5.1(a), we obtain
where we are interpreting c 0 as 0. Comparing equality (14) and inequality (15) proves the lemma.
Theorem 5.2 now follows immediately from Lemma 5.7, Lemma 5.8, and Theorem 3.4. 5.3. EVERY MOULIN MECHANISM IS (log 2 k)-APPROXIMATE. This section proves that the JV mechanism is an optimal Moulin mechanism for Steiner tree cost-sharing problems, in the sense that every no-deficit mechanism for such problems is (log 2 k)-approximate, where k is the size of an efficient outcome. To motivate our proof of this result, we begin with an example showing that our analysis of the JV mechanism is tight up to constant factors.
Example 5.9. We construct a Steiner tree instance in rounds by iteratively bisecting an edge of cost 1 as follows. Initially, we place the root t at one end of the edge and √ n players at the other end of the edge. (Think of n as a large power of 4.) In the second round, we bisect the edge with a new vertex in the middle and add √ n further players co-located at this vertex. In round j, we bisect the existing 2 j−1 edge segments and, for each new node, we add √ n new co-located players.
The construction concludes when there are n players, after (log n) rounds. Order the players in the same order in which they were added during the construction; break ties among players added in the same round arbitrarily. This defines n successive Steiner tree instances. Consider the cost share of the most recently added player of one of these instances. The JV cost-sharing method satisfies the following property: if a player is co-located with i − 1 other players (all added earlier) and is distance c away from the nearest non-co-located player that was added in an earlier round, then its cost share in this instance is (c/i). Because of this, the sum of the cost shares of players added in the jth round of the above construction is (log n). Since there are (log n) rounds, the sum of all of these successive cost shares is (log 2 n). Since the minimum-cost Steiner tree of the full instance has cost 1 and the JV cost-sharing method is positive in this instance, Proposition 3.10 implies that the induced Moulin mechanism is (log 2 n)-approximate. Theorem 5.10 implies that Steiner tree cost-sharing problems are fundamentally more difficult for Moulin mechanisms than submodular cost-sharing problems (cf., Section 4).
We now outline the proof of Theorem 5.10. At the highest level, our goal is to exhibit a (large) network G such that every O(1)-budget-balanced Steiner tree Moulin mechanism behaves like the JV mechanism in Example 5.9 on some subnetwork of G.
Fix values for the parameters k and β, where k is a power of 4. Let m be an integer
We construct a sequence of networks, culminating in G. The network G 0 consists of a set V 0 of two nodes connected by an edge of cost 1. One of these is the root t. The player set U 0 is √ k players that are co-located at the non-root node. For j > 0, we obtain the network G j from G j−1 by replacing each edge (u, w) of G j−1 with m internally disjoint two-hop paths between u and w. See Figure 2 . The cost of each of these 2m edges is half of the cost of the edge (u, w). Thus every edge in G j has cost 2 − j . Let V j denote the vertices of G j that are not also present in G j−1 . We augment the universe by placing j vertices other than the root, 2 j edges, and unit total cost. In G p , √ k players inhabit each of the 2 p = √ k non-root vertices on a line. Now fix an arbitrary cross-monotonic, β-budget balanced Steiner tree costsharing method χ. Our plan is to identify a line of G p and an ordering of the players on this line such that χ behaves like the JV cost-sharing method in Example 5.9. We construct this line iteratively via the following key technical lemma. 
for every ∈ {1, 2, . . . , √ k}.
Before proving Lemma 5.11, we use it to prove Theorem 5.10 by inductively constructing player sets S 0 , . . . , S p and orderings σ 0 , . . . , σ p with the following properties.
(1) For every j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , p}, S j corresponds to the √ k · 2 j players occupying some line L j of G j .
(2) σ j is an ordering of S j that orders the √ k players of each of its j-groups A consecutively and in a way that (16) holds with S equal to the predecessors of A in σ j .
For the base case, set S 0 = U 0 . Since χ is no-deficit, the players of S 0 can be ordered i 1 , . . . , i √ k so that χ(i , {i 1 , . . . , i }) ≥ C({i 1 , . . . , i })/ = 1/ for every . Let σ 0 denote this ordering of S 0 .
For the inductive step, let L j−1 be the line of G j−1 corresponding to S j−1 , and consider the edges of L j−1 in an arbitrary order. Each such edge gives rise to m j-groups; applying Lemma 5.11 with S equal to the players already chosen (in this and previous steps), one of these j-groups can be ordered so that (16) holds. Add an arbitrary such group to the player set, ordered after all previously chosen players and so that (16) holds. After all of the edges of L j−1 have been processed, we obtain a player set S j and ordering σ j of them that satisfy the inductive invariants (1) and (2). Now consider the sum 
Every 1-eligible group contains a player i for which χ (i, S ∪ X 1 ) ≥ 2 − j /4 √ k. Our key claim is that at least m/2β groups are 1-eligible. We prove this claim via an averaging argument that relies on the β-budget-balance and cross-monotonicity of χ. Precisely, reindex the 1-eligible groups A For example, for a submodular cost-sharing problem with n players, dividing the corresponding Shapley cost shares by an √ H n factor yields a (1, √ H n )-budget-balanced and √ H n -summable cost-sharing method. Corollary 6.2 implies the following guarantee for the induced Moulin mechanism (the scaled Shapley mechanism). COROLLARY 6.3. For every n-player submodular cost-sharing problem, the scaled Shapley mechanism is (1, √ H n )-budget-balanced and a (2 √ H n − 1)-approximation algorithm for the social cost objective.
The scaled JV mechanism is defined by dividing the JV cost shares by a (log n) factor. COROLLARY 6.4. For every n-player Steiner tree cost-sharing problem, the scaled JV mechanism is (1, O(log n))-budget-balanced and an O(log n)-approximation algorithm for the social cost objective.
The efficiency guarantees in Corollaries 6.3 and 6.4 are better than the best possible for no-deficit Moulin mechanisms (Section 4 and Theorem 5.10).
Corollaries 6.3 and 6.4 are optimal efficiency guarantees in the following sense. First, a simple example shows that a Moulin mechanism that is no better than (β, γ )-budget-balanced is no better than a γ -approximation algorithm for the social cost.
Example 6.5. Let χ be a cross-monotonic cost-sharing method for a cost function C defined on a universe U , and suppose that χ is no better than (β, γ )-budget-balanced for C. By definition, there is a subset S ⊆ U of players with i∈S χ(i, S) ≤ C(S)/γ . Give each player i ∈ S the valuation χ(i, S) and other players zero valuations. With this valuation profile, the Moulin mechanism M(χ ) outputs a set containing all of the players of S, with social cost at least C(S). The optimal social cost is at most that of the empty set, which is at most C(S)/γ . Second, the lower bound proofs in Section 4 and of Theorem 5.10 extend easily to show that all (β, γ )-budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms for submodular and Steiner tree cost-sharing problems are ((log k)/γ )-and ((log 2 k)/γ )-approximation algorithms for the social cost, respectively. Thus, no Moulin mechanism, no matter how poor its budget-balance, obtains an o( √ log k)-approximation of the social cost for submodular problems or an o(log k)-approximation of the social cost for Steiner tree problems.
Recent Work and Future Directions
We have developed an analysis framework for quantifying efficiency loss in Moulin mechanisms, and applied this framework to identify the best efficiency guarantees achievable by such mechanisms in submodular and Steiner tree cost-sharing problems, and to rigorously quantify the feasible trade-offs between efficiency and budget-balance. We conclude by discussing some of the very recent work motivated by the conference version of this article , and some possible directions for future research.
The most obvious open problems suggested by our analysis framework are to establish matching upper and lower bounds on the best-possible efficiency guarantees achievable by Moulin mechanisms for additional classes of fundamental 23:31 cost-sharing problems. Recent work has accomplished this for all of the classes of cost-sharing problems for which O(1)-budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms are known: facility location problems [Roughgarden and Sundararajan 2007] ; Steiner forest network design problems [Chawla et al. 2006 ] and a prize-collecting generalization [Gupta et al. 2007 ]; rent-or-buy network design problems [Roughgarden and Sundararajan 2007] ; and scheduling problems [Brenner and Schäfer 2007] .
An important direction for further work is the design of non-Moulin cost-sharing mechanisms. Mehta et al. [2009] recently extended Moulin mechanisms to a wider class they call "acyclic mechanisms", and prove that for several classes of costsharing problems, acyclic mechanisms can obtain approximate budget-balance and efficiency guarantees superior to those possible for Moulin mechanisms. Open problems include finding applications of acyclic mechanisms to new classes of cost-sharing problems, and generalizing acyclic mechanisms even further. On the negative side, Dobzinski et al. [2008] recently proved that the (log n) approximate efficiency lower bound of Section 4 is inescapable, even for mechanisms that are only truthful in expectation and approximately budget-balanced.
A final direction is to completely characterize different classes of strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. Thus far, Moulin [1999] characterized the groupstrategyproof (GSP) and 1-budget-balanced mechanisms (recall from Remark 2.11 that all Moulin mechanisms are GSP); Immorlica et al. [2008] partially characterized GSP mechanisms without any budget-balance assumptions; and Juarez [2007] very recently made progress toward characterizing "weakly GSP" cost-sharing mechanisms, a class that includes the acyclic mechanisms of Mehta et al. [2009] . Leveraging these characterizations to obtain matching upper and lower bounds on the best-possible budget-balance and efficiency guarantees achievable by the corresponding class of cost-sharing mechanisms is a worthy challenge for future research.
